Despite the lengthy gestation period, the reports represent only the end of beginning for many. For the survivors and their loved ones, the inquiry is the start of a process seeking accountability and justice, which will ultimately wind through many criminal courtrooms. If previous comparable processes such as Hillsborough are anything to go by, this journey will be a very long one.

For the industry, the reports mark a critical moment of self-reflection. In the short term, they represent a nexus for the regulatory change to come, and it is no surprise that many of the report recommendations are focused on this area. However, there is also a need for a wider, more existential analysis. Things have not been right in many aspects of the construction industry for some time, and this tragedy has shouted this problem out loud.

By pointing out flaws in others, the entity assigning blame implicitly elevates themselves

For me, one of the fundamental problems to be revealed is the catastrophic impact of blame culture. All construction projects are fraught with challenges, deadlines and obligations, and any significant mistake will lead to blame quickly being attributed elsewhere as each party scrambles to protect their reputation or avoid contractual censure.

At its core, blaming provides a mechanism for devaluing others. By pointing out flaws in clients, contractors or stakeholders, the entity assigning blame implicitly elevates themselves. They are, in effect, saying: ‘I am not at fault because I am more competent, more diligent and more responsible than you.’

In construction, where tasks involve many overlapping disciplines, the opportunity to assign blame is manifold and the potential for blame contagion is rife, creating an ideal breeding ground for the toxic dynamics that can characterise certain projects.

Throughout the Grenfell Inquiry proceedings, much has been made of the passing of blame between the key actors, including by the architect Studio E.

Many actors can be equally and simultaneously responsible for a project going wrong

However, if the architectural community draws a kind of comfort from the inquiry’s criticism of Studio E, if it believes the architectural incompetency identified is not widespread, then it runs the risk of missing a crucial opportunity for self-reflection. The fact is that architects do commonly specify products without exploring their suitability beyond formal certification. There are at least 4,630 residential buildings currently requiring cladding removal that can testify to this.

As the inquiry found, in the world of construction, failures are rarely the fault of one team. It is entirely possible for many actors to be equally and simultaneously responsible for a project going wrong. The act of blaming tends to obscure this shared responsibility, simplifying complex problems into an easy narrative with a single villain.

This collective responsibility highlights the interdependency of decision-making, which extends beyond the technical disciplines. For example, it seems unlikely that the Grenfell tragedy would have occurred in the absence of the specific procurement route adopted (design and build with novation). This was a decision made before a single consultant or contractor was appointed.

Regulation is certainly one way of avoiding harm, and there are many sensible recommendations in the inquiry report which will need to be swiftly and professionally implemented in this regard. However, we should not forget that previous documents, such as the Latham and Egan reports of the 1990s, have made similar recommendations, which have evidently not been wholly effective.

It is apparent that there is a parallel need for a fundamental, progressive culture change in the construction industry, a collaborative shift in mindset that goes beyond regulatory change. This should be a high-profile, identifiable change process – one that will require clear, sector-wide ownership and commitment.

It should represent a root-and-branch modernisation of the construction sector with the aim of creating a more dynamic, transparent, responsible and end-user-focused model, not unlike the recent shifts in the automotive and personal transport industries.

Indeed, for a sector suffering from a chronic skills shortage and critical lack of new SME entrants, this would seem more necessity than aspiration.

It won’t be easy, and there is, as ever, much to be cynical about change of this nature and scale. But what is the alternative?

Colm Lacey is the former chief executive of Croydon Council’s housing developer Brick By Brick and now managing director of Soft Cities, a development management and urban advisory consultancy.